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Abstract
In bilateral Negotiation Analysis, the literature often considers the case with complete information.
In this context, since the value (or utility) functions of both parties are known, it is not difficult to
calculate the Pareto frontier (or efficient frontier) and the Pareto efficient solutions for the negotiation.
Thus rational actors can reach agreement on this frontier. However, these approaches are not applied
in practice when the parties do not have complete information. Considering that the additive value
(or utility) function is used, often it is not easy to obtain precise values for the scaling weights or the
levels’ value in each issue. We compare four decision rules that require weaker information, namely
ordinal information on weights and levels, to help a mediator suggesting an alternative under these
circumstances. These rules are tested using Monte-Carlo simulation, considering that the mediator
would be using one of three criteria: maximizing the sum of the values, maximizing the product
of the excesses regarding the reservation levels, or maximizing the minimal proportion of potential.
Simulations asses how good is the alternative chosen by each rule, computing the value loss with
respect to the alternative that would be suggested if there was precise cardinal information and
determining if the chosen alternative is efficient or, if not, how far is the nearest efficient alternative.
We also provide guidelines about how to use these rules in a context of selecting a subset of the
most promising alternatives, considering the contradictory objectives of keeping a low number of
alternatives yet not excluding the best one. A further issue we investigate is whether using only
ordinal information leads to treat one of the parties unfairly, when compared to a situation in which
precise cardinal values were used instead.
Key words: Negotiation, Mediation, imprecise/ incomplete/ partial information, ordinal information, simula-
tion.
1 Introduction
It is possible to distinguish four types of procedures for deciding when several decision makers are involved
[7]: individual decision-making in a group setting, hierarchial decision making, group decision-making
and negotiation. In individual decision-making in a group setting the decision maker utilizes knowledge
of experts, advisers or stakeholders during the process. Only one person is responsible for the decision
made, but all group members participate in the process. In hierarchial decision making it is possible to
distinguish two cases: centralized and decentralized. In the centralized one, there is one set of objectives
representing the top-level decision maker, who has full control over the lower-level members. In the
decentralized case, each member independently controls subsets of the decision variables and objectives
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and is responsible for his decision which serves as input to the higher-level one. In group decision-making
each group member participates in the process and is partly responsible for the final decision. There
usually is an overall goal which is accepted by all the members, but they differ in the ways of how this goal
should be achieved. In negotiation, one negotiator represents one party and is responsible for the decision
before this party and not before the other one(s). There is a conflict of interests because parties have
separate and conflicting objectives and they have different needs which they want to satisfy. Negotiation
is the chosen way to resolve a conflict out of necessity and not out of effectiveness or efficiency. Our
focus in this paper is on situations involving two individual negotiators interacting with the assistance
of a mediator. We will consider the externally prescriptive perspective [12], according to which the
objective is to determine how mediators or arbitrators can act to help parties to negotiate in a balanced
and impartial way. The general goal of this work is to contribute with new methodologies to support a
mediator, enabling him or her to advise negotiators with “good” alternatives.
Usually it is assumed that the value of parameters of the different models is known or can be asked to a
negotiator. However, in many cases, this assumption is unrealistic or, at least, there might be advantage in
working with less precise information. We will consider that negotiators feel more “comfortable” providing
ordinal information. Thus, a negotiator could be allowed to indicate only qualitative or ordinal informa-
tion, or indicate intervals, instead of indicating precise values for the parameters of the used model. It is
possible to present different reasons why negotiators may wish to provide incomplete/imprecise/partial
information (see for example [20] and [10]). There are some approximations presented in the literature
to work with incomplete information in negotiation processes. Vetschera [19] proposed a method to mea-
sure the amount of information that is available during the negotiation. Vetschera considered integrative
negotiation and considered that the information was obtained in an implicit way through the offers.
The method is based on the domain criterion and can be used whether a compromise is reached or not.
Clímaco and Dias [4] proposed an extension of the methodology of the software VIP-G for negotiation
processes. The methodology presented adjusts itself to problems of negotiation between two parties in the
discrete case. The analysis is based on the weights space and uses the concept of convergence paths. This
methodology is suited to situations where the parties reach agreement on what issues are to maximize
and minimize. Lai et al. [11] presented a model that considers Pareto efficiency (efficient solutions are
solutions where it is not possible to improve the value for one party without worsening the value to one of
the other parties) and computational efficiency, to situations where information is incomplete, the value
functions are not linear and are not explicitly known. Ehtamo et al. [5] presented a class of interactive
methods, called constraint proposal methods, to find Pareto efficient solutions through common tangent
hyperplanes, which fit negotiations of two parties with two or more continuous subjects. Heikanen [6]
proposed a method to determine Pareto efficient solutions in negotiations with multiple parties about
continuous subjects. In this method it is not required that negotiators know the value functions of other
parties or that someone outside the negotiation knows all the value functions.
We will consider a setting of bilateral integrative negotiation over multiple issues in the discrete case.
The main assumption we will make is that the preferences of both parties can be roughly modelled by an
additive value (or utility) function, as assumed in Raiffa’s Negotiation Analysis [12]. The construction of
the proposals consists in the identification of issues to solve, in the specification of the possible levels of
resolution for each subject, and in the specification of the scores of each possible combination of levels
(scores which can be obtained through the additive value / utility model).
Instead of assuming that negotiators are able to define their value functions precisely, we assume we
only elicit ordinal information about the preferences of each party: about the weights of the different
issues and about the value of the different levels in each issue. Our objective is that, with this ordinal
information, a mediator could suggest one or more alternatives based on some decision rules we will
present in the next section. To compare these rules we will use three criteria: maximizing the sum of
the values, maximizing the product of the excesses regarding the reservation levels and maximizing the
minimal proportion of potencial. We will use simulation to test if the suggested alternative(s) is (are)
“good” alternative(s). Our objective is not to compare criteria but to compare rules. The choice of a
criterion depends on the preferences of the mediator, as all of them present advantages and disadvantages.
For example, maximizing the sum of the values may not be attractive to many because of the inequality
that usually results.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that it is possible to obtain good results considering
incomplete information regarding the preferences of the parties. The tested rules and the used criteria
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are presented in detail in the next section, which also introduces the mathematical notation. In section 3
the conducted simulations are described, and results of such simulations are presented in Section 4. We
will finish in section 5 with some conclusions and with some lines for future research.
2 Notation, criteria and decision rules
2.1 Notation
This work considers integrative negotiation among two parties over n issues. We further assume that an
additive form of the value function is appropriated (see [8] and [21] for necessary and sufficient conditions
for such additivity). Let x be one proposal. The global value of x, for a negotiator k (k = 1, 2), can be
obtained by:
V k(x) =
n∑
j=1
V kj (x) = w
k
1v
k
1 (x) + w
k
2v
k
2 (x) + ...+ w
k
nv
k
n(x) (1)
where V kj (x) = wkj vkj (x), vkj (x) represents the value of the proposal x concerning the jth issue and wkj
represents the scale coefficient or “weight” of the value function vkj (.), for party k. We assume that:
0 ≤ wkj ≤ 1, j = 1, ...n and
n∑
j=1
wkj = 1. (2)
Without loss of generality, we consider that the indices of the issues are coded such that the weights
are in decreasing order. Thus, the set of all vectors of weights compatible with this information, for party
k (k = 1, 2) is:
W k = {(wk1 , wk2 , ...wkn) : wk1 ≥ wk2 ≥ ... ≥ wkn ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
wki = 1} (3)
We also consider that, for each negotiator, we have a ranking of the value of each level in each issue, i.e.,
negotiators indicate if each issue is a maximizing one or a minimizing one. Let V k be the set of matrices,
having as elements the values vki (lji), where lji is the level j in issue i (i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,mi,
where mi is the number of levels of issue i), for party k (k = 1, 2), compatible with this information.
2.2 Criteria
We can assume that for each party some contracts are acceptable whereas others are not. In the currency
of the scoring system, each party is assumed to have a reservation value associated with its BATNA (best
alternative to a negotiated agreement). The reservation value will specify the minimum value that will
be acceptable for each party [12]. We will assess which would the most promising proposals be according
to some well-known arbitration criteria (see [12]):
- Maximizing the sum of the values: according to this criterion the chosen alternative is the one
for which the sum of the values is maximum (i.e., the alternative x for which V 1(x) + V 2(x) is
maximum).
- Maximizing the product of the excesses regarding the reservation levels: according to this criterion
the chosen alternative is the one for which the product of the excesses regarding the reservation
levels is maximum (i.e., the alternative x for which (V 1(x) − RV 1) ∗ (V 2(x)− RV 2) is maximum,
where RV k is the reservation level of party k, k = 1, 2).
- Maximizing the minimal proportion of potential (PoP): according to this criterion the chosen alter-
native is the one for which the minimal PoP is maximum. For each party, the PoP of an alternative
is obtained dividing the difference between the value of the alternative and the reservation value by
the difference between the maximum value admissible for the party and the reservation value (i.e.,
for alternative x and for party k, PoP k(x) = V
k(x)−RV k
Vmaximumk−RV k , where V
maximumk is the maximum
value for party k in the range of admissible agreements).
3
If the reservation levels are equal to zero, the criterion maximizing the product of the excesses regarding
the reservation levels corresponds to the Nash criterion, in which the objective is to maximize the product
of the values of both parties (i.e., maximize V 1(x) ∗ V 2(x)).
2.3 Decision rules
Criteria weights are usually the parameters more difficult to accurately elicit [13]. Several authors have
studied the case in which incomplete information refers only to criteria weights, in cases of multi-attribute
choice or ranking. It was verified that some decision rules based on ordinal information about the weights
(for example, the decision maker indicates that a criterion weighs more than another) lead to good results
[1, 14, 15, 16]. One of the possibilities described in the literature to deal with incomplete information
on the weights is to select a weights vector, w, from a set of admissible weights W to represent that
set and then to use w to evaluate the alternatives. The study of Barron and Barret [2] concludes that
ROC weights provide a better approximation than other weighting vectors. In this work we will extend
this idea to negotiation processes, using ROC weights when the incomplete information refers to the
issues weights. ROC weights are calculated using the following formula (assuming that the indices of
issues reflect the ranking of the weights, with wk1 being the highest weight and wkn being the lowest one),
defining the centroid of the simplex W k (3), for party k (k = 1, 2):
w
k(ROC)
i =
1
n
n∑
j=i
1
j
, i = 1, ..., n. (4)
Considering the information regarding the value of the different levels related to the different issues
we will consider three cases: negotiators can indicate the exact value of each level in each issue (values
known), negotiators can indicate a ranking of the levels in each issue and a ranking of the differences of
value between consecutive levels in each issue and negotiators can indicate only a ranking of the levels in
each issue.
Considering that negotiators can indicate a ranking of the levels in each issue and a ranking of the
differences of value between consecutive levels in each issue we will use the ∆ROC values rule (see [17]).
Hence, for an issue i, if the ∆kip are indexed by decreasing order of magnitude, we have (i = 1, ..., n):
∆k(∆ROC)ip =
1
mi − 1
mi−1∑
j=p
1
j
. (5)
where mi is the number of levels.
After determining ∆k(∆ROC)i1 , ...,∆
k(∆ROC)
i(mi−1) with the ∆ROC rule, it is possible to calculate an ap-
proximate value of each level in each issue. For issue i, and for level lji, the ∆ROC values are defined as
follows (i = 1, ..., n):
v
k(∆ROC)
i (lji) =
j−1∑
p=1
∆k(∆ROC)ip , j = 1, ...,mi. (6)
If the negotiators can indicate only a ranking of the levels in each issue one possibility is to use ROC
values for each issue (see [17]). This corresponds to the centroid of polytope defined by the ranking of
the level values on that issue. This corresponds to equally spaced values; for issue i, and for party k
(k = 1, 2) the ROC values are defined as follows (i = 1, ..., n):
v
k(ROC)
i (lji) =
mi − rki (lji) + 1
mi + 1
, j = 1, ...,m. (7)
where rki (lji) represents the rank position of the level lji considering the issue i and rki (lji) < rki (lpi) ⇒
vki (lji) ≥ vki (lpi), for party k = 1, 2.
Another possibility, if negotiators can indicate only a ranking of the levels in each issue, is to make an
approximation based on a linear value function [18]. In such cases we will consider that value functions
are linear although this is a rather strong assumption. However some authors consider that the simpler
linear function is preferable for several reasons (see [19]). Some of the presented reasons are: more general
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function also requires more parameters, as only a limited number of observations is available, the number
of parameters should be kept as small as possible (this is an advantage of the linear form, which requires
no additional parameters for the marginal value functions); any nonlinear function also entails the risk of
mis-specification, thus it could happen that even a function requiring more parameters than the simple
linear form would not provide a better approximation to the negotiator’s true preferences.
3 Simulations
To test the presented rules we used two cases as templates for generating random examples: case Nelson
vs Amstore presented in [12] and case Itex vs Cypress used in the InterNeg project (written by David
Cray of Carleton University) [9].
In Nelson vs Amstore case, there are two parties in negotiation: Amstore and Nelson. Nelson has a
construction firm and he is negotiating with a retail chain (Amstore) to build a new store. There are
three issues: price (10, 10.5, 11, 11.5 or 12 thousand dollars), design (basic or improved) and time (20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25 or 26 days). There are a total of 70 possible alternatives. For Nelson, price and time
are maximizing issues and design is a minimizing one, while for Amstore it is the opposite. Therefore, the
preferred alternative for Amstore is a price of 10 thousand dollars, an improved design and a period of
20 days. The preferred one for Nelson is a price of 12 thousand dollars, a basic design and a period of 26
days. The reservation value (on a 0-100 value scale) for Nelson is equal to 60 and for Amstore it is equal
to 20. Note that in this example, using ROC values coincides with the case in which an approximation
of the values is done considering linear value functions. This happens because the different levels of the
issues are equally spaced, and the ROC values rule coincide with the use of equal spaced values.
In Itex vs Cypress case, there are two companies: Itex Manufacturing, a producer of bicycle parts,
and Cypress Cycles that builds bicycles. Both sides negotiate over the same four issues: the price of the
bicycle components (3.47$, 3.71$, 3.98$, 4.12$ or 4.37$), delivery schedules (20 days, 30 days, 45 days
or 60 days), payment arrangements (upon delivery, 30 days after delivery or 60 days after delivery), and
terms for the return of defective parts (full price, 75% refund with 5% spoilage or 75% refund with 10%
spoilage). For each issue there is a pre-specified set of options, i.e., issue levels. Altogether, there are 180
complete and different potential offers (alternatives) that specify levels for all four issues. For Itex, price,
delivery and terms of return are maximizing issues and payment is a minimizing one, while for Cypress it
is the opposite. Therefore, the preferred alternative for Itex is a price of 4.37$, delivery in 60 days, upon
delivered payment and 75% refund with 10% spoilage. The preferred one for Crypess is a price of 3.37$,
delivery in 20 days, payment 60 days after delivery and full price refund. There is not any information
regarding the reservation level of the parties. Note that in the fourth issue, and when we are making an
approximation of level’s value using linear value functions, it is not easy to know what is the value that
should be assign to the second level. In the absence of a better reason we chose to use the value 0.5.
To use the two last criteria presented in section 2.2 (maximizing the product of the excesses regarding
the reservation levels and maximizing the minimal PoP) it is necessary to know the reservation level
for both parties in negotiation. In both examples we considered initially that the reservation levels are
equal to zero (this corresponds to the case in which there is no reservation level). In a second stage we
suppose that we know the reservation value for Nelson is equal to the value of the alternative 25 - (10.5,
basic, 23). In the original problem this is one of four alternatives that for Nelson presents a value of 60
and is the most equilibrated (presents less extreme positions). Suppose also that the reservation value
for Amstore is equal to the value of the alternative 64 - (12, basic, 20). In the original problem this
alternative presents for Amstore a value of 20. Since in the Itex vs Cypress case there is no information
regarding the reservation levels we will consider first that the reservation levels are equal to the values
of the alternative 52 - (3.71$, 30 days, 60 days after delivery, full price) and the value of the alternative
129 - (4.12$, 45 days, upon delivery, 75% refund with 10% spoilage), for Itex and Cypress, respectively,
and after we will consider that the reservation levels are equal to the value of the alternative 86 - (3.98$,
30 days, 30 days after delivery, 75% refund with 5% spoilage) and the value of the alternative 95 (3.98%,
45 days, 30 days after delivery, 75% refund with 5% spoilage), for Itex and Cypress, respectively. These
alternatives correspond, approximately, to the 25th percentile and to the 50th percentile for Cypress and
Itex.
To generate random examples for these templates, the level values vki (lji) were generated from a
uniform distribution in the interval [0,1] and then normalized in such a way that the highest value in
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each issue would be 1 and the lowest value would be 0. For each issue, suppose that vkloi and vkhii were
the lowest and highest values among the mi generated for party k. Then, the normalized value of vki (lji)
is equal to (vki (lji)− vkloi )/(vkhii − vkloi ), for k = 1, 2. The scaling weights were also generated according
to an uniform distribution in W k using the process described in [3]. To generate the weights for the
n-issue case, we draw n− 1 independent random numbers from a uniform distribution on (0, 1) and rank
these numbers. Suppose the ranked numbers are rk(n−1) ≥ ... ≥ rk(2) ≥ rk(1) for party k. The following
differences can then be obtained: wkn = 1− rk(n−1), wkn−1 = rk(n−1) − rk(n−2), ..., wk1 = rk(1) − 0. Then, the
set of numbers (wk1 , wk2 , ..., wkn) will add up to 1 and will be uniformly distributed on the unit simplex
defined by the rank-order constraints (3), k = 1, 2.
For each random problem, defined by a level value matrix and a weights vector, the additive model
provides the overall value of each alternative, which produces a ranking of the alternatives. This is what
we call the supposedly true ranking, i.e., the ranking that would be obtained if this cardinal information
was known. On the other hand, each of the rules produces rankings using ordinal information about the
weights vector and the level values matrix. We will consider that:
- xreal(sum): is the real best alternative according to the criterion maximizing the sum of the values;
- xreal(product): is the real best alternative according to the criterion maximizing the product of the
excesses regarding the reservation levels;
- xreal(PoP ): is the real best alternative according to the criterion maximizing the minimal PoP;
- xrule(sum): is the best alternative provided by the rule according to the criterion maximizing the
sum of the values;
- xrule(product): is the best alternative provided by the rule according to the criterion maximizing the
product of the excesses regarding the reservation levels;
- xrule(PoP ): is the best alternative provided by the rule according to the criterion maximizing the
minimal PoP.
We started by determining the value loss, i.e., the difference between the real value of the best
alternative and the real value of the alternative chosen by the rule (considering the criteria maximizing the
sum of the values, maximizing the product of the excesses regarding the reservation levels and maximizing
the minimal PoP), in cases in which the two alternatives did not match. For example, in the case of the
criterion maximizing the sum of the values, the value loss is given by (V 1(xreal(sum))+V 2(xreal(sum)))−
(V 1(xrule(sum)) + V 2(xrule(sum))). For the other criteria the idea is the same. This allows us to know
if the alternatives chosen by the rules have global value much inferior to the best alternatives in reality.
Note that the maximum possible value loss is equal to 200 to the criterion maximizing the sum of the
values, is equal to 10000 to the criterion maximizing the product of the excesses regarding the reservation
levels and is equal to 1 to the criterion maximizing the minimal PoP.
To see if the alternative chosen by the rule is a good alternative, we determined also the proportion of
cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient. Remember that efficient solutions are solutions where it
is not possible to improve the value for one party without worsening the value to one of the other parties.
When the chosen alternative is not efficient we determined the distance between the chosen alternative
and the nearest efficient alternative. We determined the distance between the two alternatives using two
type of distances: L2 and L∞. Let x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2) be two proposals. The Lp (p = 2 and ∞)
distances can be calculated by:
- L2 (Euclidean distance): d(x, y) =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + (x2 − y2)2
- L∞ (Tchebychev distance): d(x, y) = max{|x1 − y1|, |x2 − y2|}
We determined also the difference between the real value of the best alternative and the real value
of the alternative chosen by the used criterion, for party 1 and party 2. For example, for the criterion
maximizing the sum of the values we determined (V 1(xreal(sum))−V 1(xrule(sum))) and (V 2(xreal(sum))−
V 2(xrule(sum))). This enables us to know whether using only ordinal information leads to treat one of
the parties unfairly, when compared to a situation in which precise cardinal values were used instead. We
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consider that the alternative obtained by a rule, x, is a fair (unbiased) approximation if ((V 1(xreal(sum))−
V 1(xrule(sum)) ≈ (V 2(xreal(sum))− V 2(xrule(sum)))
Comparing the ranking of the alternatives according to the supposedly true parameters with the
ranking of the alternatives according to the used decision rule, we consider the following results:
- the position that the best alternative according to the true ranking reaches in the ranking generated
by the used decision rule (this allows us to know the minimum number of alternatives that must be
chosen, beginning by the top of the ranking provided by the rule, so that the true best alternative
belongs to the chosen set);
- the position that the best alternative in the ranking generated by the rule reaches in the supposedly
true ranking (this allows us to know how good the alternative chosen by the rule is in terms of the
supposed true ranking).
The position that the best alternative according to the true ranking reaches in the ranking generated
by the used decision rule allows us to assess the strategy of retaining k < m alternatives instead of
only one. The position that the best alternative in the ranking generated by the rule reaches in the
supposedly true ranking complements the other results that show if the alternative chosen by the rule is
a good alternative (the value loss, the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient and
the distance between the chosen alternative and the nearest efficient alternative).
In the next section we will present the results of 5000 iterations per simulation (after verifying that
using a greater number of problems did not affect significantly the results).
4 Results
In this section we will present the results of the simulations described in the previous section. During
this section and in the tables referred, ROC TRUE refers to the use of ROC weights and TRUE values,
ROC ∆ROC refers to the use of ROC weights and ∆ROC values, ROC ROC refers to the use of ROC
weights and ROC values and ROC Linear refers to the use of ROC weights and Linear values. All the
referred tables are presented in Appendix. During this section we will present results of statistics tests
considering a significance level equal to 0.01.
4.1 Examples based on the Nelson vs Amstore template
4.1.1 No information available about the reservation levels of the parties
In Table 1 it is possible to see the value loss of the different rules considering the different criteria, i.e., the
difference between the real value of the real best alternative and the real value of the alternative chosen
by the rule. This table shows the average, the standard deviation, the maximum, the 75th percentile and
the 95th percentile of the value loss. As expected, the worst results are obtained using ROC ROC / ROC
Linear (because these are the cases in which less information is required from negotiators). Using ROC
TRUE or ROC ∆ROC the results are very similar. The value loss is not very high even considering ROC
ROC / ROC Linear.
Table 2 presents the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient (using the different
rules and considering the different criteria). Using the ROC TRUE the proportion is highest and using
the ROC ROC / ROC Linear the proportion is lowest (as expected). In the cases in which the chosen
alternative is not efficient it is interesting to know the distance to the nearest efficient alternative. The
results are presented in Tables 3 and 4, using the L2 and L∞ distances, respectively. In these tables it
is possible to see the average, the standard deviation, the maximum, the 75th percentile and the 95th
percentile of the distance. Considering the Euclidean distance, the best results (lower distances) are
obtained using the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC (these rules presented very similar results). Using the
other distance (L∞), the conclusions are the same. Note that the different rules yield worse results for
the criterion of maximizing the minimal PoP than the other criteria. The proportion of cases in which
the chosen alternative is efficient is not very high and, besides that, when the chosen alternative is not
efficient the distance to the closest efficient alternative is not so small.
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We computed some statistics tests to check if the difference between the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC
rules is significative (these are the two rules that provide the best results). We determined the p - value,
i.e., the lowest level of significance at which the hypothesis of equality of the rules can be rejected. The
results are presented in Table 5. In this table it is possible to see the p - value when comparing the
average of the value loss, the average of the Euclidean distance, the average of the L∞ distance of the
two rules and also the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient. As it is possible to
see considering the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient, and using the criterion
maximizing the sum of the values, the ROC TRUE rule is better. In all the other cases the difference
between the two rules is not significative. It seems that the ROC ROC rule is the one which provide
worst results. We also computed some statistics tests to check if the difference between the ROC ROC
and ROC ∆ROC rules are significative. As the p-values are equal to zero or very close, we can conclude
that the ROC ∆ROC rule is better than the ROC ROC rule.
We can see in Tables 6 and 7 the difference between the real value of the best alternative and the real
value of the alternative chosen by the used criteria, for Nelson and Amstore, respectively. In these tables
it is possible to see the average of the difference. As it is possible to see, the best approximation for Nelson
would occur if maximizing the minimal PoP was used, because the average difference is small. Even using
this criterion, in average, Nelson loses with respect to the real best alternative, because the difference is
positive. When maximizing the sum of the values, worse approximations for Nelson appear. The best
results (smaller differences) are obtained using the ROC TRUE rule and the worst (bigger differences)
are obtained using ROC ROC / ROC Linear rule. Using the the sum of the values criterion, in average,
Amstore wins comparing with the real best alternative. For Amstore, the least favorable approximations
are obtained using the criterion maximizing the minimal PoP. It is possible to see that, in average, both
parties lose in using the rules instead of real values, except Amstore with the criterion maximizing the
sum of the values. It is possible to consider that the criterion maximizing the minimal PoP provides a
fair (unbiased) approximation, because the considered difference is similar for both parties. The same
does not happen for the criterion maximizing the sum of the values.
Detailed results related to the position that the best alternative according to the different rules reached
in the supposedly true ranking, are presented in Table 8. This table shows, for each rule and for each
criteria, the average position on the supposedly true ranking (the minimum position was always 1) and
the proportion of cases where the position reached is 1, ≤ 2, ≤ 3, ≤ 4, ≤ 5, ≤ 10 and ≤ 20. This table
gives us the information to know how many alternatives should be chosen to guarantee the retention of the
supposed best alternative. As expected, as the total number of alternatives is equal to 70, retaining only
one alternative is not sufficient in the majority of the cases. However, even then, we can consider that the
“hit rate”, i.e., the proportion of cases in which the best alternatives in the two rankings coincide, is not
very bad. Retaining 20 alternatives (close to 30% of the total number of alternatives) the probability of
retaining the best one is almost always higher than 90%. The hit rate using the ROC ROC / ROC Linear
values and the criterion maximizing the sum of the values is surprisingly high. This happens because the
high number of ties (using ROC / Linear values, the value functions of both parties are symmetrical, and
because of that, when the weights match there are a lot of alternatives with equal sum of values).
Results relatively to the position of the best alternative using the different rules in the supposedly
true ranking are shown in Table 9. These results enable us to know how good is the alternative chosen
by each rule in terms of the supposedly true ranking. Note that the value of the hit rate should be the
same considering the position of the supposedly best alternative in the rankings induced by the rules and
the position of the best alternative using the different rules in the supposedly true ranking. However this
did not happen because, if there are ties in the first place of the ranking, which is frequent when the
different rules are used, the chosen alternative is the first one with position in the ranking equal to one.
Because of that, the hit rate considering the position of the supposedly best alternative in the ranking
induced by the different rules is superior or equal than the hit rate considering the position of the best
alternative using the different rules in the supposedly true ranking. These results complement the ones
regarding the value loss, the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient and, if the
alternative is not efficient, the distance to the nearest efficient alternative. In more than 81% of the cases
the alternative chosen by the rule is one of the best 20 ones. If we consider the ROC TRUE and ROC
∆ROC rules, in more than 83% of the cases the alternative chosen by the rule is one of the best 10 ones.
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4.1.2 Information available about the reservation levels of the parties
In this section we considered that an alternative needs to be better than the reservation levels, for both
parties, to be admissible. In our simulation study, there were cases in which there was no alternative
better than the reservation levels for both parties. We eliminated these cases and increased the number
of simulations in such a way to have 5000 valid examples. In Table 10 it is possible to see the average,
the standard deviation and maximum number of alternatives better for both parties than the reservation
levels (the minimum number was always equal to 1). Note that, using all the rules, the average number
of alternatives better than the reservation levels is near 19 alternatives (in a total of 70 alternatives).
In the original problem we have 26 alternatives better than the reservation levels for both parties. To
determine a realistic value loss we decided to analyze only the cases in which the alternative provided
by each rule is admissible. Indeed, no value loss would occur if the alternative proposed by the mediator
was unacceptable for one of the parties, since there would be no agreement. As a curiosity, in Table 11
we present the proportion of cases in which each rule provides a non admissible alternative.
Table 12 presents the value loss of the different rules considering the different criteria. As expected, the
worst results are obtained using ROC ROC / ROC Linear rule. Comparing with the results considering
no reservation levels it is possible to see that the value loss of the criterion maximizing the sum of the
values is slightly lower and the value loss of the criterion maximizing the minimal PoP is slightly higher
in this case. These results are normal since we are excluding of the analysis some alternatives (the non
admissible ones). Using the criterion maximizing the product of the excesses the value loss is much higher
considering no reservation levels because in this case the aggregated global value is also much higher.
In Table 13, it is possible to see the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient.
Using the ROC TRUE rule the proportion is highest and using the ROC ROC / ROC Linear rule
the proportion is lowest. With the criterion maximizing the minimal PoP, using the three rules, the
proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient is higher considering information regarding
the reservation levels. The opposite happens considering the criterion maximizing the sum of the values.
In the cases in which the chosen alternative is not efficient we determined the distance to the nearest
efficient alternative. The results are presented in Tables 14 and 15, using the L2 and L∞ distances,
respectively. Considering the Euclidean distance, the best results are obtained using the ROC TRUE
rule. Using the criterion maximizing the sum of the value, with all the rules, the results are better
considering no reservation levels. The opposite happens when it is use the criterion maximizing de
minimal PoP. With the L∞ distance the conclusions are the same.
We computed some statistics tests to check if the difference between the ROC TRUE and ROC
∆ROC rules are significative. The obtained p-values are presented in Table 16. As it is possible to see
the difference between the two rules is significative considering the value loss and the criterion maximizing
the minimal PoP, considering the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient and using
the criteria maximizing the sum of the values and maximizing the product of the excesses regarding the
reservation level. In these cases the ROC TRUE rule presents better results. Remember that considering
no reservation levels the difference between the two rules is only significative considering the proportion
of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient and using the criterion maximizing the sum of the
values. It seems that the ROC ROC / ROC Linear rule is the one which provides worst results. Table
17 presents the p-values obtained when the objective was to check if the difference between the ROC
∆ROC and ROC ROC / ROC Linear rules is significative. Considering the distances and the criteria
maximizing the minimal PoP and maximizing the product of the excesses it is not possible to consider
that the ROC ∆ ROC rule is better. Remember that considering no reservation levels it is possible to
conclude that the ROC ∆ ROC rule is always better.
We also computed some statistics tests to compare the ROC ∆ROC rule considering no reservation
levels and considering reservation levels. Results are presented in Table 18. We chose this rule because
between the two best rules is the one which require less information from negotiators. The difference
between the two cases is significative considering the value loss and the criterion maximizing the product
of the excesses, considering the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient and the
criterion maximizing the minimal PoP, and considering the L∞ distance and the criterion maximizing the
minimal PoP. In these cases better results are obtained considering reservation levels. Considering the
value loss and the criterion maximizing the minimal PoP, and the distances and the criterion maximizing
the sum of the values, the best results are obtained considering no reservation levels.
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Tables 19 and 20 show the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value of the
alternative chosen by the used criteria, for Nelson and Amstore, respectively. As it is possible to see, the
rules are less prejudicial for Nelson when maximizing the product of the excesses regarding the reservation
levels. Even using this criterion, in average, Nelson loses with respect to the real best alternative. The
best results are obtained using the ROC TRUE rule and the worst are obtained using ROC ROC /
ROC Linear rule. For Amstore, the criterion for which rules are more beneficial is to maximize the sum
of the values. With this criterion, in average, Amstore wins comparing with the real best alternative.
It is possible to see that, in average, both parties lose in using the rules instead of real values, except
Amstore with the criterion maximizing the sum of the values. Note that considering no reservation levels
the worst/best criterion for Nelson/Amstore was the same (maximizing the sum of the values) the same
does not happen to the best/worst criterion for Nelson/Amstore. With these results it is also possible to
consider that when the criterion maximizing the sum of the values is used, the rules does not provide a
fair approximation (as it was concluded considering no reservation levels).
Results related to the position that the best alternative according to the different rules reached in
the supposedly true ranking, are presented in Table 21. This table gives us the information to know how
many alternatives should be chosen to guaranty the retention of the supposed best alternative. Retaining
20 alternatives the probability of retaining the best is always higher than 90%. The differences between
the results considering no reservation levels and considering reservation levels are not very significative.
Results relatively to the position of the best alternative using the different rules in the supposedly true
ranking are shown in Table 22. In more than 90% of the cases the alternative chosen by the rule is one
of the best 20 ones. If we consider the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC rules, in more than 85% of the
cases the alternative chosen by the rule is one of the best 10 ones. The results are slightly better than
the results obtained considering no reservation levels.
4.2 Examples based on the Itex vs Cypress template
4.2.1 No information available about the reservation levels of the parties
Tables 23 and 24 show the value loss of the different rules and the proportion of cases in which the
chosen alternative is efficient, respectively. In the cases in which the chosen alternative is not efficient we
determined the distance to the nearest efficient alternative. The results are presented in Tables 25 and
26, using the L2 and L∞ distances, respectively.
As it is possible to see the ROC ROC and ROC Linear rules are the ones which provide worst results,
and ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC rules are the ones which provide best results. We computed some
statistics tests to check if the difference between the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC rules are significative.
The results of the p-values are presented in Table 27. It is possible to see that the difference between
the two rules is significative considering the value loss and considering the proportion of cases in which
the chosen alternative is efficient. In these cases the ROC TRUE rule present better results. Note that
in this example the difference between the two rules is more significative than in the example presented
in section 4.1.1. The results of the statistics tests comparing the ROC ROC and ROC Linear rules are
presented in Table 28. Observing the p-values it is possible to conclude that the difference between the
two rules are not significative. We also compared the ROC ∆ROC and ROC ROC rules (one of the
best and one of the worst) to check if the difference between them are significative. In all the cases we
obtained p-values equal to zero, what means that the difference between the rules is significative. So, it
is possible to conclude that the ROC ∆ROC rule presents better results than the ROC ROC rule. Note
that, in section 4.1.1 we concluded the same.
In Tables 29 and 30, we can see the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value
of the alternative chosen by the used criteria, for Itex and Cypress, respectively. As it is possible to see,
the best approximation for Itex occurs when maximizing the minimal PoP, because the average difference
is small. Even using this criterion, in average, Itex loses with respect to the real best alternative, because
the difference is positive. The worst criterion for Itex is maximizing the sum of the values. For Cypress,
the best criterion is to maximize the sum of the values but, even with this criterion, in average, Cypress
loses comparing with the real best alternative. For Cypress, the worst results are obtained using the
criterion maximizing the product of the excesses regarding the reservation levels. It is possible to see
that, in average, both parties loses in using the rules instead of real values. With these results it is also
possible to see if the alternative chosen by the rule is a fair approximation. As we concluded in subsection
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4.1.1., it is possible to consider that using the criterion maximizing the sum of the values, the rules do
not provide a fair approximation.
Results related to the position that the best alternative according to the different rules reached in the
supposedly true ranking, are presented in Table 31. As expected, as the total number of alternatives is
equal to 180, retaining only one alternative is not sufficient in the majority of the cases. However, even
then, we can consider that the hit rate, is quite reasonable. Retaining 20 alternatives (close to 12% of
the total number of alternatives) the probability of retaining the best is higher than 85%, considering
the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC rules. Retaining 20 alternatives in this example correspond, more or
less, to retaining 10 alternatives in the example presented in the last section. The obtained results are
not very different. Results relatively to the position of the best alternative using the different rule in the
supposedly true ranking are shown in Table 32. In more than 72% of the cases the alternative chosen by
the rule is one of the best 20 ones. If we consider the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC rules, in more than
74% of the cases the alternative chosen by the rule is one of the best 10 ones. Once more, the obtained
results are not very different from the ones obtained in subsection 4.1.1.
4.2.2 Information available about the reservation levels of the parties
In Table 33, it is possible to see the average, the standard deviation and maximum number of alternatives
better than the reservation levels for both parties, considering that the reservation level of Itex is equal
to V I(x86) and the reservation level of Cypress is equal to V C(x95). Note that, using all the rules, the
average number of alternatives better than the reservation levels is near 38 alternatives (in a total of 180
alternatives). We will not present the results obtained considering that the reservation levels are equal
to the values of the alternatives 52 and 129, for Itex and Cypress, respectively, because they are not very
different from the ones obtained considering that there are no reservation levels.
We can see in Table 34 the proportion of cases in each the alternative chosen by each rule is not
admissible. Table 35 shows the value loss of the different rules considering the different criteria and Table
36 shows the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient. In the cases in which the
chosen alternative is not efficient we determined the distance to the nearest efficient alternative. The
results are presented in Tables 37 and 38, using the L2 and L∞ distances, respectively.
We performed some statistical tests to check if the difference between the ROC TRUE values and
ROC ∆ROC rules (the two best rules) are significative. The results of the p-values are presented in Table
39. The only cases where it is not possible to conclude that the ROC TRUE rule is better is considering
the distances and the criterion maximizing the product of the excesses regarding the reservation levels.
Note that the difference between the two rules is more significative considering reservation levels and
more significative than in section 4.1.2. The ROC ROC and ROC Linear rules are the ones which provide
worst results, so we computed some statistics tests to see if the difference between them is significative.
The results are presented in Table 40. In all the cases it is possible to conclude that the two rules present
similar results (as it was concluded considering no reservation levels). Similarly to what we done in the
previous subsection we also compared the ROC ∆ROC and ROC ROC rules. In all the cases we obtained
p-values equal to zero, or very close, what means that the difference between the two rules is significative,
this difference is favorable to the ROC ∆ROC rule. This is the same conclusion we obtained considering
no reservation levels. Remember that in the examples for the Nelson vs. Amstore template (see section
4.1.2) it was not always possible to conclude that the ROC ∆ROC rule is better.
As in the examples for the Nelson vs. Amstore template, we compared the ROC ∆ROC rule consid-
ering reservation values and considering no reservation levels (see results in Table 41). Considering the
value loss and the criteria maximizing the sum of the values and maximizing the product of the excesses
the best results are obtained considering reservation levels. Considering the value loss and the criterion
maximizing the minimal PoP, the proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient and
the criteria maximizing the sum of the values and maximizing the minimal PoP, the distances and the
criterion maximizing the product of the excesses the best results are obtained considering no reservation
levels. The results are very different from the ones obtained in subsection 4.1.2. However this difference
is natural since in one example we are considering reservation levels very different between the parties
and in the other example the reservation levels of both parties are similar.
In Tables 42 and 43, it is possible to see the difference between the value of the best alternative and
the value of the alternative chosen by the used criteria, for Itex and Cypress, respectively. The rules
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provide a better approximation for Itex when maximizing the minimal PoP. Even using this criterion,
in average, Itex loses with respect to the real best alternative. For Cypress, the best approximation
occurs for the criterion maximize the sum of the values but even with this criterion, in average, Cypress
loses comparing with the real best alternative. The conclusions are the same obtained considering no
reservation levels.
Table 44 presents the position that the best alternative according to the different rules reached in the
supposedly true ranking. Results relatively to the position of the best alternative using the different rule
in the supposedly true ranking are shown in Table 45. The results are not very different from the ones
considering no reservation levels.
5 Conclusions
In bilateral Negotiation Analysis, the literature often considers the case with complete information,
which cannot be applied in practice when the parties do not have complete information. In this work
we considered a setting of bilateral integrative negotiation over multiple issues in which the preferences
of both parties can be roughly modelled by an additive value function. We compared four decision rules
(ROC TRUE, ROC ∆ROC, ROC ROC and ROC Linear) to help a mediator suggesting an alternative
under these circumstances, considering that there exists ordinal information both on the scaling weights
and on the level’ values, and tested them using Monte-Carlo simulation.
We compared the four rules using two cases as templates for generating random examples (one with 70
alternatives and the other one with 180 alternatives). In all cases we used three criteria: maximizing the
sum of the values, maximizing the product of the excesses regarding the reservation levels and maximizing
the minimal PoP. Note however that our objective was not to compare the criteria but to compare the
rules. The choice of the used criteria depends on the mediator preferences.
To compare the rules we determined the proportion of cases in which each rule chose the really best
alternatives and in the cases in which the two rules did not match we determined the value loss. We
determined the proportion of cases in which the alternative chosen by each rule is efficient, and for the
inefficient ones we determined the distance to the nearest efficient alternative (using the L2 and L∞
distances). The results using the two cases as templates for generating random examples were different
and the results considering no reservation levels and considering reservation levels were also different.
But, it is possible to conclude that the best results were obtained using the ROC TRUE and ROC
∆ROC rules. There are cases in which it is possible to consider that these rules are equivalent which
is, in a certain way, surprising, because in the ROC TRUE rule we require cardinal information about
the levels’ values from the negotiators. The ROC ROC and ROC Linear rules are the worst ones, and
it is possible to consider that the difference between them is not significative. The ROC ∆ROC rule is,
almost always, better than the ROC ROC rule. We determined also the difference between the real value
of the best alternative and the real value of the alternative chosen by the used criterion, for both parties.
This enables us to know whether using only ordinal information leads to treat one of the parties unfairly,
when compared to a situation in which precise cardinal values were used instead. We also compared
the ranking of the alternatives according to the supposedly true parameters with the ranking of the
alternatives according to the used decision rule, we considered the following results: the position that
the best alternative according to the true ranking reaches in the ranking generated by the used decision
rule (this allows us to know the minimum number of alternatives that must be chosen, beginning by the
top of the ranking provided by the rule, so that the true best alternative belongs to the chosen set) and
the position that the best alternative in the ranking generated by the rule reaches in the supposedly true
ranking (this allows us to know how good the alternative chosen by the rule is in terms of the supposed
true ranking).
In our opinion the results are encouraging. Considering that the total number of alternatives is high
the hit rate is relatively good and when the rule does not choose the real true alternative the average
value loss is not very high. The proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient is high
and when the chosen alternative is not efficient the distance to the nearest efficient alternative is not
very high. The position that the best alternative in the ranking generated by the rule reaches in the
supposedly true ranking complements that results that show the alternative chosen by the rule is typically
a good alternative. In the majority of the cases negotiators, in average, lose in using the rules instead of
real values for all the criteria, however the average loss is not very high. The criterion maximizing the
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sum of the values is the one which provides less balanced approximations between the two parties. It was
possible to see that, although the hit rate is relatively high, retaining one alternative is not sufficient in
the majority of the cases. But, if instead of one alternative, the mediator keeps for example a set of 20
alternatives, the probability of this set containing the real best alternative is very high. The position that
the best alternative according to the true ranking reaches in the ranking generated by the used decision
rule allowed us to assess the strategy of retaining k < m alternatives instead of only one.
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A Results
Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 9.1331 10.2414 82.7968 12.7696 30.3641
ROC ∆ROC 9.3535 10.1638 74.8539 12.7093 29.7159
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 14.8723 13.3471 91.6100 21.4859 41.6842
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 666.6783 758.1803 5064.9614 942.2391 2249.4214
ROC ∆ROC 656.0594 758.7748 5452.6670 884.8055 2233.3544
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 925.0817 847.7156 6665.5542 1319.7663 2622.4553
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 0.0819 0.0772 0.5393 0.1182 0.2377
ROC ∆ROC 0.0857 0.0802 0.5808 0.1198 0.2477
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 0.1140 0.1015 0.8017 0.1639 0.3179
Table 1: Value Loss (reservation levels equal to 0 for Nelson and Amstore).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 94.26 91.06 80.92
ROC ∆ROC 92.22 90.22 79.18
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 88.72 78.36 67.46
Table 2: Proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient (reservation levels equal to 0 for
Nelson and Amstore).
Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 6.3796 4.9173 26.3772 8.5454 15.9898
ROC ∆ROC 6.0499 4.8757 38.7505 8.1107 15.4725
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 7.5029 5.9274 36.7852 10.3016 19.4668
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 7.9482 6.2996 42.2776 10.1963 21.1535
ROC ∆ROC 8.0421 6.4076 36.5928 10.5669 20.9423
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 10.6254 9.5886 58.8975 14.1004 30.6239
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 9.5344 7.1672 42.0696 12.6078 24.4005
ROC ∆ROC 9.5435 7.4248 42.6280 13.1596 24.7427
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 11.0923 8.9947 58.8975 14.8755 29.6205
Table 3: Distance between the chosen alternative and the nearest efficient alternative - Euclidean distance
(reservation levels equal to 0 for Nelson and Amstore).
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Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 5.5997 4.3370 25.9145 7.5848 14.2417
ROC ∆ROC 5.2915 4.2197 34.3092 7.1573 13.0022
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 6.5896 5.1403 33.4238 9.1746 16.2932
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 7.0156 5.5839 33.1487 9.2238 18.7618
ROC ∆ROC 7.1175 5.7924 33.3152 9.2655 19.1413
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 9.2627 8.2360 53.4606 12.4060 26.6948
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 8.5284 6.4665 38.2792 11.5202 21.6739
ROC ∆ROC 8.5705 6.8003 39.5629 11.9348 22.3459
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 9.8039 7.8970 53.4606 13.3540 25.8158
Table 4: Distance between the chosen alternative and the nearest efficient alternative - L∞ distance
(reservation levels equal to 0 for Nelson and Amstore).
Sum Product PoP
Value Loss 0.4037 0.5889 0.0390
Efficient 0.0001 0.1493 0.0294
Euclidean Distance 0.3872 0.8213 0.9778
L∞ Distance 0.3556 0.7841 0.8873
Table 5: p - values comparing the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC rules (reservation levels equal to 0 for
Nelson and Amstore).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 8.3781 3.4446 3.2014
ROC ∆ROC 8.8379 4.0453 3.4283
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 20.7354 6.0176 4.5321
Table 6: Average of the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value of the alternative
chosen by the used criterion, for Nelson (reservation levels equal to 0 for Nelson and Amstore).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE -3.1522 1.8095 3.2114
ROC ∆ROC -2.9489 1.8195 2.8835
ROC ROC = ROC Linear -9.4563 5.0615 5.9737
Table 7: Average of the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value of the alternative
chosen by the used criterion, for Amstore (reservation levels equal to 0 for Nelson and Amstore).
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Sum
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 4.1774 53.68 64.72 73.14 76.32 81.68 89.84 95.84
ROC ∆ROC 4.8620 49.02 61.20 70.02 74.48 78.94 87.88 94.22
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 6.8776 56.26 60.68 64.32 67.44 70.54 81.32 88.28
Product
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 3.5760 48.24 62.56 71.20 77.06 81.70 92.82 98.16
ROC ∆ROC 4.1648 41.14 56.20 65.54 72.64 77.64 90.48 97.58
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 7.5086 26.72 36.98 42.88 53.38 57.30 76.80 89.70
PoP
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 4.7068 28.36 45.52 54.52 62.78 68.92 89.80 98.42
ROC ∆ROC 5.1068 25.70 42.22 51.58 59.38 66.30 87.54 98.00
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 6.9452 20.00 33.18 40.74 47.44 55.34 78.44 93.80
Table 8: Position of the supposedly best alternative in the ranking induced by the different rules (reser-
vation levels equal to 0 for Nelson and Amstore).
Sum
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 5.6654 43.06 57.40 65.72 71.78 75.46 85.90 92.80
ROC ∆ROC 6.1456 37.04 51.96 60.72 67.04 71.84 83.84 92.54
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 11.4146 26.42 37.86 44.68 50.18 54.54 68.98 81.54
Product
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 4.6790 43.74 57.70 67.78 74.04 78.38 88.06 94.64
ROC ∆ROC 5.0938 36.66 53.12 63.76 70.10 75.50 87.26 94.24
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 8.7072 22.50 33.50 42.82 51.10 56.78 74.16 88.10
PoP
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 5.2058 28.36 40.82 52.98 62.32 69.32 87.14 96.58
ROC ∆ROC 5.4474 25.46 37.46 50.58 60.94 67.94 86.12 96.40
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 7.4214 17.02 27.60 40.12 49.46 56.28 78.20 92.42
Table 9: Position of the best alternative according to the different rules in the supposedly true ranking
(reservation levels equal to 0 for Nelson and Amstore).
Average Std Deviation Maximum
ROC TRUE 17.6903 12.0926 62
ROC ∆ROC 17.7689 12.5636 64
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 19.0303 13.6112 64
Table 10: Number of alternatives better than the reservation levels for both parties (reservation levels
equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 0.1489 0.1052 0.0947
ROC ∆ROC 0.1775 0.1214 0.1128
ROC ROC / ROC Linear 0.2362 0.1728 0.1531
Table 11: Proportion of cases in which the alternative chosen by the rule is not admissible (reservation
levels equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
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Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 8.5090 10.4751 85.9244 11.6505 29.0580
ROC ∆ROC 8.6598 10.1872 70.0000 11.6663 29.7934
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 10.7544 11.1101 89.2211 14.9577 33.7866
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 208.6108 304.1034 2617.3030 255.2163 776.7140
ROC ∆ROC 210.6686 277.6787 2526.7637 277.0149 762.7409
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 319.3760 387.0792 4993.2212 435.3348 1075.5727
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 0.1681 0.1645 0.9362 0.2362 0.5048
ROC ∆ROC 0.1797 0.1679 0.9740 0.2621 0.5152
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 0.2210 0.1912 0.9784 0.3319 0.6031
Table 12: Value Loss (reservation levels equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respec-
tively).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 92.36 91.24 85.60
ROC ∆ROC 89.60 89.20 84.02
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 78.13 78.13 71.90
Table 13: Proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient (reservation levels equal to
V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 7.4556 5.3827 35.4586 10.0752 17.1159
ROC ∆ROC 7.3184 5.9418 35.9007 10.2493 19.3874
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 8.9726 7.5034 51.2293 12.4509 24.6487
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 8.3894 5.9185 35.0713 11.9186 19.2113
ROC ∆ROC 8.7418 6.9838 39.4867 11.7945 22.3840
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 9.6347 7.7069 52.1393 13.4973 25.2543
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 8.0832 5.8025 32.0241 11.1472 19.1810
ROC ∆ROC 8.6453 7.0068 39.4867 11.9391 22.6442
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 9.5111 7.6036 52.1393 13.2749 25.1272
Table 14: Distance between the chosen alternative and the nearest efficient alternative - Euclidean distance
(reservation levels equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
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Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 6.6105 4.8314 29.6134 8.8616 15.6956
ROC ∆ROC 6.4633 5.2190 29.3920 9.0571 17.1782
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 7.8849 6.5620 49.2881 10.9297 21.7608
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 7.4049 5.3039 29.5458 10.3116 17.0891
ROC ∆ROC 7.6524 6.1198 32.3248 10.2590 19.8609
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 8.4602 6.6965 45.5016 11.4770 21.7481
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 7.2076 5.2186 29.5458 10.0637 16.9583
ROC ∆ROC 7.7054 6.3278 34.2648 10.3447 20.0945
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 8.4078 6.6624 45.5016 11.4281 22.5617
Table 15: Distance between the chosen alternative and the nearest efficient alternative - L∞ distance
(reservation levels equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
Value Loss 0.6403 0.8159 0.0094
Efficient 0.0000 0.0024 0.0707
Euclidean Distance 0.7415 0.4362 0.1194
L∞ Distance 0.5499 0.5369 0.1261
Table 16: p - values comparing the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC rules (reservation levels equal to
V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
Value Loss 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Efficient 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Euclidean Distance 0.0000 0.0275 0.0112
L∞ Distance 0.0010 0.0225 0.0213
Table 17: p - values comparing the ROC ROC and ROC ∆ROC rules (reservation levels equal to V N (x25)
and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
Value Loss 0.0150 0.0000 0.0000
Efficient 0.2312 0.0742 0.0000
Euclidean Distance 0.0008 0.1113 0.0112
L∞ Distance 0.0000 0.1706 0.0076
Table 18: p - values comparing the ROC ∆ROC and ROC ∆ROC rules considering no reservation
levels and considering reservation levels (reservation levels equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and
Amstore, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 5.0279 1.1744 1.5013
ROC ∆ROC 5.6932 1.7034 1.8331
ROC ROC = ROC Linear 10.6905 3.3974 3.7524
Table 19: Average of the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value of the alterna-
tive chosen by the used criterion, for Nelson (reservation levels equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson
and Amstore, respectively).
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Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE -0.7197 2.5724 2.2709
ROC ∆ROC -0.2822 2.9296 2.3836
ROC ROC = ROC Linear -1.1040 5.4362 4.3285
Table 20: Average of the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value of the alter-
native chosen by the used criterion, for Amstore (reservation levels equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for
Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
Sum
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 3.9941 46.95 60.52 69.38 75.39 79.64 90.31 97.39
ROC ∆ROC 4.4883 42.21 56.08 66.04 71.66 76.66 88.58 96.43
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 5.8016 43.12 51.65 57.79 63.38 67.66 82.57 93.54
Product
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 3.3509 46.17 62.61 72.19 78.41 82.97 93.78 99.06
ROC ∆ROC 3.7519 40.66 58.26 68.39 75.03 79.93 92.12 98.69
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 5.5518 27.05 43.38 53.96 61.07 67.19 84.09 96.51
PoP
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 3.9202 33.07 51.12 63.03 71.92 77.54 92.90 99.15
ROC ∆ROC 4.2970 30.22 48.34 59.96 69.07 75.20 90.97 98.55
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 5.7918 21.00 36.99 48.18 57.77 64.20 83.86 96.72
Table 21: Position of the supposedly best alternative in the ranking induced by the different rules (reser-
vation levels equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
Sum
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 4.6979 42.03 56.70 65.61 72.17 76.24 86.50 96.37
ROC ∆ROC 5.1184 35.90 51.24 61.49 67.96 72.68 85.13 96.06
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 7.6877 24.60 36.94 46.38 52.89 58.12 73.54 90.86
Product
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 3.4862 46.17 60.68 70.88 77.02 81.51 92.98 99.16
ROC ∆ROC 3.8166 40.66 56.12 67.00 74.60 79.31 91.73 99.02
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 5.5110 27.05 41.40 52.34 60.10 66.50 83.16 97.30
PoP
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 3.9925 33.07 49.40 61.55 70.97 76.49 92.66 99.39
ROC ∆ROC 4.2480 30.22 46.40 59.12 68.73 75.10 91.34 99.15
ROC Linear = ROC ROC 5.7214 21.00 35.58 46.97 55.74 63.07 83.64 97.78
Table 22: Position of the best alternative according to the different rules in the supposedly true ranking
(reservation levels equal to V N (x25) and V A(x64) for Nelson and Amstore, respectively).
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Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 6.5015 7.8848 81.9559 8.6773 21.5471
ROC ∆ROC 8.0700 8.5475 76.4573 11.2015 24.0444
ROC ROC 13.8244 12.8242 92.7779 19.4077 39.6037
ROC Linear 13.6954 12.7268 107.4878 19.0680 38.0641
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 495.8791 592.5318 5534.3892 662.4846 1644.0372
ROC ∆ROC 566.6768 574.4958 4992.4771 791.1349 1702.3535
ROC ROC 901.5501 763.2006 4940.0244 1311.0825 2391.2342
ROC Linear 942.3477 815.1173 7282.7578 1361.1470 2499.7881
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 0.0613 0.0586 0.6000 0.0865 0.1758
ROC ∆ROC 0.0713 0.0624 0.5090 0.1036 0.1905
ROC ROC 0.1036 0.0840 0.5717 0.1486 0.2647
ROC Linear 0.1026 0.0855 0.6106 0.1471 0.2684
Table 23: Value Loss (reservation levels equal to 0 for Itex and Cypress).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 93.52 91.52 78.08
ROC ∆ROC 86.70 83.92 71.58
ROC ROC 70.76 64.28 52.24
ROC Linear 68.86 64.42 54.38
Table 24: Proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient (reservation levels equal to 0 for
Itex and Cypress).
Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 4.5382 3.6693 31.3354 5.9837 10.6441
ROC ∆ROC 5.1697 4.1178 31.6802 7.0169 13.0660
ROC ROC 7.9413 6.6948 41.9947 10.7435 21.3565
ROC Linear 7.6789 6.4491 46.6887 10.2455 21.1384
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 5.8982 5.2021 37.2921 7.6332 15.8221
ROC ∆ROC 5.4954 4.4734 32.1554 7.6322 14.5 084
ROC ROC 8.4742 7.3383 49.2268 11.5466 23.4395
ROC Linear 8.3068 6.9107 44.0468 11.2836 22.8509
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 6.9010 6.0906 46.5559 8.8486 20.0976
ROC ∆ROC 6.9352 5.8390 43.2304 8.9151 18.5517
ROC ROC 8.8898 7.1920 49.4757 12.2976 23.1018
ROC Linear 9.0281 7.1493 54.3297 12.4337 23.0572
Table 25: Distance between the chosen alternative and the nearest efficient alternative - Euclidean distance
(reservation levels equal to 0 for Itex and Cypress).
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Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 4.0128 3.3228 31.2611 5.1972 9.4800
ROC ∆ROC 4.5543 3.5643 24.8643 6.2533 11.0313
ROC ROC 6.9497 5.7741 40.5663 9.3560 18.9336
ROC Linear 6.7018 5.5550 42.9326 8.9152 18.1948
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 5.1963 4.5181 31.6275 6.5837 13.9875
ROC ∆ROC 4.8280 3.8895 26.2871 6.5516 12.7212
ROC ROC 7.3850 6.3283 41.7894 10.0931 19.8200
ROC Linear 7.2085 5.8847 40.2117 9.5947 19.2210
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 6.1102 5.3582 46.3592 7.8851 17.4627
ROC ∆ROC 6.1127 5.0719 35.4446 7.9285 16.6225
ROC ROC 7.7702 6.2279 41.7894 10.7844 19.9629
ROC Linear 7.8656 6.1417 47.2825 10.6376 19.5373
Table 26: Distance between the chosen alternative and the nearest efficient alternative - L∞ distance
(reservation levels equal to 0 for Itex and Cypress).
Sum Product PoP
Value Loss 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Efficient 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Euclidean Distance 0.0147 0.1763 0.8869
L∞ Distance 0.0189 0.1547 0.9905
Table 27: p - values comparing the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC rules (reservation levels equal to 0 for
Itex and Cypress).
Sum Product PoP
Value Loss 0.6465 0.0194 0.5820
Efficient 0.0385 0.8838 0.0319
Euclidean Distance 0.2733 0.4832 0.5100
L∞ Distance 0.2298 0.3885 0.5946
Table 28: p - values comparing the ROC ROC and ROC Linear rules (reservation levels equal to 0 for
Itex and Cypress).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 3.5428 2.0298 1.7836
ROC ∆ROC 4.8839 2.4150 1.8617
ROC ROC 11.2240 5.4766 4.3485
ROC Linear 8.7135 5.6907 4.2226
Table 29: Average of the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value of the alter-
native chosen by the used criterion, for Itex (reservation levels equal to 0 for Itex and Cypress).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 0.3971 1.8884 1.6044
ROC ∆ROC 0.7679 2.9493 2.2982
ROC ROC 0.2227 5.4766 4.3516
ROC Linear 2.5497 5.2677 4.1894
Table 30: Average of the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value of the alter-
native chosen by the used criterion, for Cypress (reservation levels equal to 0 for Itex and Cypress).
22
Sum
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 5.1624 47.52 60.64 70.56 75.00 79.72 88.28 94.80
ROC ∆ROC 6.8662 43.52 53.86 61.26 67.52 71.50 82.76 91.76
ROC ROC 14.3946 37.34 41.66 46.22 49.44 53.66 66.06 77.54
ROC Linear 18.0544 25.78 31.88 37.22 43.82 46.56 60.38 74.84
Product
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 5.1538 42.40 56.76 65.90 71.58 75.98 87.88 95.06
ROC ∆ROC 7.3708 31.86 46.40 55.54 61.64 66.46 80.32 90.98
ROC ROC 15.4054 18.44 26.18 32.66 38.28 42.58 59.14 75.96
ROC Linear 15.4960 19.04 27.42 33.40 38.96 43.42 58.64 75.92
PoP
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 7.5956 25.36 39.20 48.58 56.06 61.88 78.00 90.46
ROC ∆ROC 9.8108 21.58 32.24 40.28 47.72 52.98 70.00 85.10
ROC ROC 17.7646 12.52 19.18 24.24 29.34 33.78 51.00 69.56
ROC Linear 17.5306 14.04 20.74 26.76 31.10 36.00 51.54 70.80
Table 31: Position of the supposedly best alternative in the ranking induced by the different rules (reser-
vation levels equal to 0 for Itex and Cypress).
Sum
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 6.2516 39.40 55.64 64.56 70.16 74.56 85.54 93.30
ROC ∆ROC 9.1728 29.94 43.64 52.96 59.76 64.42 78.22 88.64
ROC ROC 20.8542 17.20 27.16 33.52 38.82 43.26 57.88 72.88
ROC Linear 19.8978 17.76 26.98 33.94 39.02 43.84 58.76 74.22
Product
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 5.7854 41.64 55.52 65.18 71.16 75.42 86.72 93.98
ROC ∆ROC 7.5408 31.24 45.84 54.58 61.44 66.62 80.86 90.98
ROC ROC 16.4602 17.88 28.04 35.26 40.36 45.36 60.52 76.00
ROC Linear 16.3464 18.36 27.52 34.60 40.34 45.60 61.18 76.08
PoP
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 6.9946 25.36 39.90 49.08 56.72 62.40 80.86 93.08
ROC ∆ROC 8.7976 21.48 33.94 42.62 50.12 56.08 74.52 88.98
ROC ROC 15.1948 12.20 20.68 27.52 33.54 38.12 56.96 76.20
ROC Linear 15.0010 13.64 22.34 29.78 35.50 40.58 58.10 76.74
Table 32: Position of the best alternative according to the different rules in the supposedly true ranking
(reservation levels equal to 0 for Itex and Cypress).
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Average Std Deviation Maximum Minimum
ROC TRUE 38.2726 19.1917 110 2
ROC ∆ROC 38.1759 17.4110 97 2
ROC ROC 37.2910 12.4327 52 4
ROC Linear 36.7956 13.0861 55 2
Table 33: Number of alternatives better than the reservation levels for both parties (reservation levels
equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 0.1254 0.0494 0.0495
ROC ∆ROC 0.1510 0.0790 0.0790
ROC ROC 0.2111 0.1215 0.1264
ROC Linear 0.2078 0.1236 0.1237
Table 34: Proportion of cases in which the alternative chosen by the rule is not admissible (reservation
levels equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 5.9463 6.5508 54.0802 8.1745 19.1710
ROC ∆ROC 6.8367 6.9591 47.0883 9.5945 20.8384
ROC ROC 10.1607 8.9225 59.6517 14.8223 28.1451
ROC Linear 9.9807 8.8235 71.6798 14.2356 27.3813
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 172.2259 214.5850 1797.9627 226.5396 617.2684
ROC ∆ROC 199.1753 218.5182 1501.9280 271.1409 659.2973
ROC ROC 294.5875 263.9202 1641.3989 428.1743 821.5392
ROC Linear 300.3229 264.4241 1608.4762 426.5116 815.7595
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 0.1598 0.1441 0.8820 0.2298 0.4486
ROC ∆ROC 0.1738 0.1508 0.8708 0.2532 0.4807
ROC ROC 0,2123 0,1661 0,8774 0,3156 0,5331
ROC Linear 0.2065 0.1621 0.8464 0.3002 0.5272
Table 35: Value Loss (reservation levels equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 90.91 88.47 79.79
ROC ∆ROC 84.28 80.84 71.13
ROC ROC 68.69 58.17 54.20
ROC Linear 68.38 60.48 56.50
Table 36: Proportion of cases in which the chosen alternative is efficient (reservation levels equal to
V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
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Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 4.8535 4.0202 25.2434 6.3320 13.2327
ROC ∆ROC 5.6929 4.6677 31.8151 7.6128 15.0990
ROC ROC 8.8975 7.8206 49.3784 11.9883 24.2859
ROC Linear 8.3629 7.0988 51.5835 11.3329 23.0141
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 5.6735 4.7981 35.0469 7.2301 14.7303
ROC ∆ROC 6.1966 4.9340 31.0535 8.1386 16.5560
ROC ROC 8.4434 6.9001 57.2317 11.3165 22.6750
ROC Linear 8.7796 7.6751 70.3028 11.7894 24.861
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 6.2399 5.0706 35.0469 8.1630 17.0049
ROC ∆ROC 6.8458 5.3402 39.1335 9.2583 17.3928
ROC ROC 8.5837 6.8962 57.2317 11.8020 22.3722
ROC Linear 8.9705 7.5280 70.3028 12.4112 23.4569
Table 37: Distance between the chosen alternative and the nearest efficient alternative - Euclidean distance
(reservation levels equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
Sum
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 4.3276 3.6287 24.6506 5.5945 11.2268
ROC ∆ROC 4.9989 4.0315 26.3850 6.5698 13.7558
ROC ROC 7.6887 6.5601 41.3378 10.4096 20.4455
ROC Linear 7.2723 6.0841 44.4360 9.8583 19.9724
Product
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 5.0177 4.1917 27.2377 6.5673 12.9298
ROC ∆ROC 5.4665 4.3637 24.5040 7.2484 14.6581
ROC ROC 7.3520 5.9657 57.2285 9.8184 19.5012
ROC Linear 7.6315 6.5354 52.7250 10.3646 20.5019
PoP
Average Std Deviation Maximum P75 P95
ROC TRUE 5.5247 4.4333 29.3216 7.3052 14.3647
ROC ∆ROC 6.0238 4.6960 32.9987 8.1621 15.5254
ROC ROC 7.4665 5.9658 57.2285 10.1244 19.2476
ROC Linear 7.8041 6.4114 52.7250 10.8046 20.1950
Table 38: Distance between the chosen alternative and the nearest efficient alternative - L∞ distance
(reservation levels equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
Value Loss 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Efficient 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Euclidean Distance 0.0008 0.0401 0.0043
L∞ Distance 0.0025 0.0448 0.0073
Table 39: p - values comparing the ROC TRUE and ROC ∆ROC rules (reservation levels equal to
V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
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Sum Product PoP
Value Loss 0.4275 0.3648 0.1341
Efficient 0.7356 0.0182 0.0203
Euclidean Distance 0.0439 0.1410 0.0732
L∞ Distance 0.0639 0.1534 0.0682
Table 40: p - values comparing the ROC ROC and ROC Linear rules (reservation levels equal to V I(x86)
and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
Value Loss 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Efficient 0.0006 0.0001 0.6185
Euclidean Distance 0.0232 0.0017 0.6689
L∞ Distance 0.0257 0.0012 0.6263
Table 41: p - values comparing the ROC ∆ROC and ROC ∆ROC rules considering reservation levels and
considering no reservation levels (reservation levels equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress,
respectively).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 2.3057 1.7337 1.5767
ROC ∆ROC 3.7951 2.6102 2.3648
ROC ROC 8.1129 5.2274 4.2974
ROC Linear 6.7649 5.5292 4.3161
Table 42: Average of the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value of the alterna-
tive chosen by the used criterion, for Itex (reservation levels equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and
Cypress, respectively).
Sum Product PoP
ROC TRUE 1.2421 1.9209 1.7385
ROC ∆ROC 1.4292 2.6682 2.4730
ROC ROC 2.5780 5.3033 4.3695
ROC Linear 3.6710 5.1048 4.3930
Table 43: Average of the difference between the value of the best alternative and the value of the alterna-
tive chosen by the used criterion, for Cypress (reservation levels equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex
and Cypress, respectively).
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Sum
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 6.6694 42.63 56.28 64.00 68.47 72.79 82.60 90.22
ROC ∆ROC 8.1518 37.94 48.20 55.59 61.61 66.21 78.04 87.15
ROC ROC 11.2434 33.88 38.15 42.28 46.53 51.03 63.66 81.02
ROC Linear 11.1575 25.52 31.88 37.34 44.25 47.82 64.86 83.25
Product
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 5.3612 40.35 54.32 62.91 68.70 73.13 84.58 94.88
ROC ∆ROC 7.1152 29.09 42.52 51.05 57.42 62.58 78.48 91.41
ROC ROC 12.2043 19.16 25.71 32.41 36.46 41.68 57.98 79.09
ROC Linear 11.3907 18.51 25.85 32.58 37.58 41.85 61.09 82.66
PoP
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 6.3178 27.36 41.46 50.72 58.68 64.18 81.32 94.11
ROC ∆ROC 8.0142 21.60 33.33 41.92 48.52 54.99 74.19 90.37
ROC ROC 12.9865 14.36 21.01 27.10 31.97 37.61 55.84 77.34
ROC Linear 12.0989 14.80 22.44 28.61 32.87 38.24 59.51 80.91
Table 44: Position of the supposedly best alternative in the ranking induced by the different rules (reser-
vation levels equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
Sum
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 6.0472 37.31 54.04 62.37 68.53 72.85 84.40 92.92
ROC ∆ROC 7.9753 27.93 43.04 52.48 59.31 64.77 78.52 89.00
ROC ROC 13.5755 17.99 27.16 34.33 39.79 44.18 60.78 77.16
ROC Linear 13.0248 17.70 26.73 34.37 40.52 45.63 62.26 79.40
Product
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 4.8391 40.33 55.59 64.08 69.52 74.34 87.83 96.13
ROC ∆ROC 6.6139 29.03 43.65 53.06 60.43 65.89 81.23 92.47
ROC ROC 10.7798 18.39 27.72 34.99 40.61 45.23 64.44 83.68
ROC Linear 10.7942 18.17 27.40 35.34 41.53 47.34 65.77 84.42
PoP
Average % 1 % ≤ 2 % ≤ 3 % ≤ 4 % ≤ 5 % ≤ 10 % ≤ 20
ROC TRUE 6.1101 27.36 42.11 52.01 60.14 66.17 83.43 94.56
ROC ∆ROC 7.9611 21.54 33.81 42.86 50.36 56.60 75.83 90.61
ROC ROC 11.3189 13.70 23.35 30.72 36.62 41.78 61.08 82.70
ROC Linear 11.3112 14.54 24.06 31.90 37.96 43.71 63.75 83.34
Table 45: Position of the best alternative according to the different rules in the supposedly true ranking
(reservation levels equal to V I(x86) and V C(x95) for Itex and Cypress, respectively).
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